Introduction
The burgeoning reproductive assistance industry has created an uneasy tension between individual economic interests and human dignity. On the one hand, people who donate sperm or eggs claim to have a right to remuneration for goods and services. If a person has a right to sell blood or hair, then that person should have a right to sell gametes. On the other hand, the commodification of tissues which have the potential to become adult human beings threatens human dignity and other moral values. Matters become even more complicated when we consider ownership of human genomes, since genomes are not simply pieces of tissue, but are blueprints for making and regulating organisms.
This essay develops a framework for thinking about the moral basis for a market in human reproductive materials. It argues that the commodification of gametes and genes is morally acceptable although there should not be a market for zygotes, embryos, or genomes. This position may be at odds with current property laws of many countries, which forbid the buying and selling of bodies and body parts, but the paper is concerned with moral, not legal issues. However, this essay may have some bearing on the morality of current or pending statutes, regulations, or court decisions.
The moral basis for commodifying body parts Before turning to this paper's main topic, it will be useful discuss the moral basis for the commodification of body parts in general. Commodification is a social practice for treating things as commodities, ie as properties that can be bought, sold, or rented. Since commodities are alienable they can be sold it is possible to regard something as a form of property but not as a commodity. For to Andrews, the principle of autonomy provides a basis for treating the body as property.4 Most of our autonomous choices presuppose some control over our own bodies. If we think of ownership of an object as a collection of rights to control the use of that object, then autonomous individuals own their bodies, body parts, and body products. Many of the most important standards in medical ethics also reflect this viewpoint. For example, invasive medical procedures require ethical justification. The very notion of an invasion of the body draws on the body-as-property image, since an invasion is an intrusion into a territory. The doctrine of informed consent also draws on the body-asproperty view. Informed consent holds that competent individuals have a right to exclusive control over their bodies, and exclusive control over an object is a characteristic of ownership.
For the purposes of this essay, I will accept the body-as-property view. I realise that this is a controversial position, but I will not defend it fully here. (I refer the reader to other authors for further discussion.7) Instead of defending this view, I will consider some arguments against commodification and use them to argue for incomplete commodification of the living body (I include the word "living" here to indicate that this discussion does not apply to cadavers, unless indicated otherwise.)
Why might one regard the body as commodity but resist its complete commodification? To answer this question it will be useful to address two important moral arguments against commodification. The first argument appeals to Kantian concerns about human dignity and personhood; the second examines the social consequences of ownership practices, attitudes, and policies. I will discuss these arguments in different contexts throughout this essay. Unrealistic portrait However, this argument paints an unrealistic portrait of the connection between persons and bodies. The body is not like a coat that we can wear or a tool that we can use. Although it is possible to distinguish between the person and the body, these two entities are intimately connected in human beings.'" Selling a living human body is virtually the same thing as selling a person, and having exclusive control over someone else's body is tantamount to slavery. Only those who maintain a rigid mind/body dualism will not concede that there is an intimate relationship between the mind and body.
Yet this close connection only holds between the whole body and the person; it does not hold between parts (or products) of the body and the person. Although we think of persons as being connected to whole bodies, we do not think of persons as being tied to particular body parts or products. One does not lose a part of one's self by cutting one's hair, urinating, or donating blood. Thus, it is important to distinguish between a whole human body and its parts or products. Doing something to a part of the body does not imply doing something to the whole body, and selling a part (or product) of the body need not imply selling a whole body. Hence, one may commodify a part or product of the body without commodifying the whole body. (Some people view their personal identity as being closely connected to certain parts, such as the brain or heart, but this observation does not undermine my general point.)
With this distinction in mind, one might hold that parts of the body may be commodified even if the whole body should not be. Since the whole body is intimately connected to the person, it should not be viewed as alienable property.4 5 Hence, the whole body should not be treated as a complete commodity. But we can treat parts of the body as alienable even if the whole body should not be treated this way. Thus, one may hold that selling a whole body is immoral but regard commerce in human tissue as morally acceptable. However, there still may be some good reasons for regulating the sale of body parts. For instance, one might hold that it is immoral to sell body parts that are essential to the body's proper functioning because this form of commerce would imply murder, suicide, or other forms of killing. People may sell one kidney but not two kidneys, since human bodies cannot function without two kidneys. (A person might still give away his or her second kidney, but I will not address that question here.) Some organs, such as the heart and brain, may not be sold, given our current medical limitations and philosophical views about the connection between the person and the brain.
The second argument against treating bodies as commodities addresses slippery slope concerns: although it is not inherently wrong to sell body parts or products, the acceptance of this practice will lead to adverse social consequences as we move toward complete commodification of the body.'
According to Kass, if we allow body parts or products to be sold, then we will start to view the whole body as an object or commodity. This attitude will lead to the dehumanisation and objectification of people.9 Our downward slide might start with the selling of body parts, but it will lead to trade in children, anencephalic babies, cadavers, and PVS patients. Eventually we will sell adults into slavery. To preserve our belief in the inherent worth of human life and dignity, we must not view any part of the body as having commercial value.
While I appreciate the force of this argument, I think that we can avoid these adverse social consequences by regulating the market in body parts or products.4 We could forbid the sale of things whose commercialisation would have an adverse impact on our respect for human life and dignity, such as human cadavers, PVS bodies, anencephalic newborns, and so on. Informed consent would also seem to be a wise restriction on any commerce in body parts or products. By requiring that sellers and buyers give informed consent before a transaction takes place, we may be able to avoid many pitfalls. One of the biggest threats from a market in body parts comes when other people are allowed to treat a person's body as a commodity without that person's consent. 4 Other writers object to commodification on the grounds that it undermines the gift relationship that currently exists between donors and recipients of human organs. A market in body parts and products will eventually destroy this relationship by transforming it into an economic transaction." I do not find this argument very convincing since many commodities that are routinely bought and sold are also given as gifts, such as clothing, land, cars, and labour. People will always have reasons and motives for giving gifts, even when those gifts have commercial value. The mere fact that an object can be bought or sold need not destroy our ability to transfer that object as a gift.
Some writers have pointed out that commodifying parts of the body might lead to a practice where people are required to sell body parts or products to pay outstanding debts or to meet the demands of retributive justice. Thus the phrase "it cost me an arm and a leg" would be too real to invoke laughter. However, I think we can avoid these disturbing consequences if we enact some restrictions on the transference of body parts or products. For instance, we could make it illegal to take body parts or products to pay debts or administer punishments.
Finally, one might argue that the selling of body products could lead to the exploitation of the economically worse-off members of our society. People might sell their kidneys out of economic hardship.' ' But why would we think it is wrong to sell body parts out of economic need? After all, people take on many dangerous and degrading occupations for economic reasons. If it is wrong to sell kidneys out of economic need, then it is also wrong to work in a coal mine or deliver pizzas in dangerous neighbourhoods. The problem with working under these conditions is not the economic transaction itself; it is the fairness of the transaction. We have laws that protect people from exploitation and regulate working conditions. Similar laws could also apply to a market in body parts and products.
The preceding arguments against commodification all suggest a common response: body parts and products, but not the whole body, should be regarded as incomplete commodities. In order to answer Kantians' concerns about the objectification of people, we should not permit a market in whole, living, human bodies; in order to address the slippery slope argument, we should regulate the market in body parts and products. I will now apply this analysis to the commodification of human reproductive materials, paying special attention to the two main arguments against commodification.
The commodification of reproductive materials Is it immoral to buy and sell sperm, eggs, zygotes, embryos, or genomes? Before answering this Resnik 391 question, it will be useful to distinguish between the sale of reproductive services (which is usually legal), and the sale of the reproductive materials themselves (which is often illegal). In the debate about surrogate mothering, some authors have argued that contracts with gestational surrogates are not baby-selling because these women are only selling the use of their wombs.'2 Although I think this is an interesting distinction, I do not think it makes much sense for the issues that are the topic of this paper, since we are not dealing with forms of commodification that can be easily treated as mere services. Carrying a child in a womb is clearly a valuable service, but how is ejaculation a service? A donor who does not provide sperm will not be paid. The same point holds for other reproductive materials. Thus, this essay will focus only on the sale of reproductive materials.
Commodification of gametes
If it is morally acceptable to commodify body parts of products, then gametes may be bought and sold, since gametes are body products. If individuals can buy and sell blood, hair, or tissue, then they should also be allowed buy and sell gametes. ' However, zygotes are potential persons. Zygotes, unlike gametes, have a complete set of genetic instructions and normally also have their own genetic identity. Although human development depends on many different environmental factors and gene-environment interactions, zygotes are much more like adult human beings than gametes. As potential persons, zygotes merit special moral concern.'4 Potential persons merit special moral concern because the way we treat these beings can have a profound effect on the way we treat actual persons. A society that allows babies to be bought and sold is more likely to allow adults to be bought and sold than one that does not. Likewise, a society that allows zygotes to be bought and sold is more likely to accept a market for children and adults than one that does not. Moreover, this is not a problem that can be handled simply through regulation, since a market in zygotes would imply a profound change in our understanding of human beings and could lead to the commodification and objectification of children and adults. Since even a limited market for zygotes can create this dangerous slippery slope, zygotes should not be commodified. As an aside, this discussion has some bearing on disputes between couples over the use of frozen embryos. In one case, a woman wanted to implant a frozen embryo that she had produced with her estranged husband, but he refused to let her do this.1' Since frozen embryos should not be treated as commodities, this man should not be able to sell his rights to the embryo. Embryos also should not be traded for other items in divorce settlements. Although my view does not imply that embryos should not be treated as property, the slippery slope argument I have considered in this essay suggests that even allowing embryos to be treated as property could have some adverse consequences that we would want to avoid, such as baby-selling and the objectification of people. To avoid these consequences, the courts should treat embryos like children, not like commodities or other forms of property. The embryo's best interests, not market concerns or property rights, should play the deciding role in settling these cases. Resnik 393 genomes to be bought and sold is more likely to allow human beings to be bought and sold than one that does not."7 Selling copyrights to an entire genome is very much like selling a zygote, since genomes can be used to make zygotes.
On the other hand, patents and copyrights on parts of the genome would not entail the commodification of whole human bodies and probably would not threaten our respect for human life and human dignity. Patents or copyrights on individual genes would be no more pernicious than patents or copyrights on artificial body parts, such as artificial skin, blood, or heart valves. Thus, copyrights and patents can be extended to parts of the genome, but they should not be applied to the whole genome. However, there may be some good reasons to regulate the market in gene patents and copyrights in order to prevent slippery slope effects. For instance, we might choose to restrict the marketing of human genes used for the sole purpose of genetic engineering; we might forbid people or companies from acquiring a whole genome; we might take steps to prevent companies from obtaining monopolies on human genes, and so on. Hence, the entire human genome should not be regarded as a commodity, although parts of the genome may be regarded as incomplete commodities.
Conclusion
In this essay, I have argued that gametes and genes may be treated as incomplete commodities, while whole genomes, zygotes, and embryos should not be commodified at all. Markets in gametes and genes should also be regulated in order to prevent potential threats to human dignity and other moral values. I should note that this paper has not addressed other important questions pertaining to the ownership of human reproductive materials. Commodification simply represents a particular form of control, but other types of control are possible, such as stewardship, partnership, and so on.20 21 A discussion of these other forms of ownership could provide some additional insights into proprietary relationships in human reproduction, but I will not engage these issues here.
